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Drawing on empirical examination of six European MNE-subsidiaries and using a multiple-case 
method & process analysis, this paper investigates the nexus between subsidiaries & civil society 
actors in institutional void that affect legitimacy development. Study finds four different levels 
(i.e. degree) of legitimacy- acceptance, image, endorsement, and synergy (acceptance + 
efficiency) that subsidiaries earn, develop, or co-develop in collaboration with CS actors in 
internationalization. Our study brings a new insight on legitimacy theory in international 
management in a way that isomorphism perspective of legitimacy cannot explain the complexity 
of subsidiary legitimization in institutional void. This is because subsidiaries not only earn 
acceptance by complying to institutional context, they also create and co-create image, 
endorsement and synergy by strategic initiatives. We thus combine institutional isomorphism and 
institutional innovation perspective in legitimization and conclude that subsidiaries strategic 
endeavours generate various levels of legitimacy as an output; not just acceptance level only. It 
is although difficult to separate legitimacy and efficiency as an intermingled strategic outcome 
because subsidiaries fill up institutional void by institutional innovation and create operational 
efficiency as well as legitimacy in market and society. We therefore conceptualize the 
development of different levels of legitimacy using a ‘spiral metaphor’ and combine 
isomorphism perspective with institutional innovation and business model-fit in order to 
illustrate how they influence legitimacy and efficiency development in institutional void context. 
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How MNEs earn and maintain legitimacy has been an interesting research agenda in international 
business studies (Zeng, Luo, & Maksimov, 2015; Scherer, Palazzo, and Seidle, 2013; Gammeltoft, 
Filatotchev, Hobdari, 2012; Meyer, Mudambi, and Narula, 2011; Delmestri and Wezel, 2011; 
Gifforda, and Kestler, 2008; Chan and Makino, 2007; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). This is 
interesting because different scholars cover different perspectives of legitimacy (den Hond et al., 
2014;Scherer, Palazzo, and Seidle, 2013; Bitektine, 2011;Rao, Chandy & Prabhu, 2008; Dacin, 
Oliver and Roy, 2007), strategies of legitimacy (de Haro and Bitektine, 2015; Rana and Sørensen, 
2014; Scherer, Palazzo, and Seidle, 2013; Bitektine, 2011; Chan and Makino, 2007) and contexts in 
which firms’ earn, develop, and defend their legitimacy (Castelló and Galang, 2014; Reimann, et al. 
2012; Forstenlechner and Mellahi, 2011; Ahlstrom, Bruton and Yeh, 2008; Gifforda and Kestler, 
2008). As defined, legitimization is a process by which a firm’s behaviour and actions are perceived 
to be proper and appropriate by socially constructed systems of rules, norms, rationales/logics, and 
beliefs, and thus firms get ‘accepted’ (Suchman, 1995) and gain a ‘right to exist’ in society (Maurer, 
1971). This is relatively a complex process for foreign subsidiaries compared to local private 
companies (Nell, Puck, & Heidenreich, 2015) because MNE subsidiaries involve in foreign and 
multiple contexts in which multiple and heterogeneous actors (i.e. headquarter, institutional, civil 
society, & transnational actors) and phenomena (e.g. multiple–embeddedness, pressures, 
expectations, interests, and logics) (see, Scherer, Palazzo, and Seidle, 2013; Greenwood, Raynard 
and Kodeih, 2012; Greenwood, et al. 2010; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999) shape the condition to 
which subsidiaries can develop or co-develop legitimacy. In this paper we focus on the nexus 
between civil society actors and MNE subsidiaries in institutional void context to see how 
subsidiaries interact with social actors, use various strategies and thereby build various levels 
legitimacy. Since legitimacy is a context specific evaluation of multiple evaluators, firm’s actions 
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would seem to be appropriate depending on the expectations and nature of institutions and social 
actors’ that are influential in the evaluation process. Social actors’ judgements therefore would not 
only affect the subsidiary ‘acceptance’ but also its degree of image and endorsements, which shapes 
the credibility of corporate entity and operation in a foreign context. 
Previous studies focused on NGOs and investigated their influence on MNE governance & 
operation (Vachani, Doh, and Teegen, 2009; Doh and Guay, 2006; Teegen, Doh, and Vachani, 
2004) that lead to both tension (Yaziji & Doh, 2009) and resource advantages in the legitimization 
process (Lambell, et al. 2008; Marano and Tashman, 2012). In this vein, our study focuses on 
various types of civil society actors (CS) (i.e. NGOs, Associations, activist networks, and 
individuals with welfare mind-set) and investigates how subsidiaries in institutional void work with 
those CS actors in pursuit of earning and coevolving different levels (degrees) of legitimacy. We 
consider civil society as a broader social phenomenon that occupies a social space both in national 
and transitional context (Rana and Maria, 2017). 
 
Previous studies illustrate that subsidiaries tend to be adaptive, manipulative, and innovative in 
order to succeed in institutional void context (see, Khanna and Paleppu, 2010); however, they 
overlook the nexus between subsidiaries and civil society actors in institutional void in which CS 
tends to provide both complementary resources, acceptance, and also tensions, in case firms fail to 
meet social expectations and standards (Lambell et al. 2008). Although previous studies examined 
the legitimization strategies (Regnér and Edman, 2014; Castelló and Galang, 2012; Reimann et al. 
2012; Ahlstrom, Bruton and Yeh, 2008), yet we know little about whether strategic implications by 
subsidiaries in void context lead to ‘acceptance’ / ‘right to exist’ only or beyond that? At least no 
empirical study has been carried out on this question and at this point our study makes an effort to 
shed light on it. 
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Our study informs that subsidiary’s collaborative initiative with CS actors co-evolve different levels 
of legitimacy, which is often more than the threshold level legitimacy i.e. ‘acceptance’. Above the 
threshold level, subsidiary legitimization process derives efficiency in operation, cost management, 
market development and customer awareness creation- – both economic and operational efficiency-, 
identity & image value creation, and endorsement– together with ‘acceptance’. Thus, they illustrate 
different levels of subsidiary legitimacy. We therefore argue that subsidiaries legitimization process 
appears to be inseparable from the efficiency generation process in institutional void. To mean 
‘levels of legitimacy’ we do not refer to micro or macro levels of legitimacy (see, as presented by 
Bitektine, 2015) nor do we indicate various levels of analysis, rather we indicate different outcomes 
of legitimization process that reflect different degrees of legitimacy. 
We acknowledge that firms encounter various challenges and opportunities at different phases of 
internationalisation. Keeping this in consideration, we analyse legitimization process of six 
European subsidiaries in Bangladeshi context in terms of three major phases of internationalisation–
pre-entry, entry, and post-entry. The aim is to understand different levels of legitimacy subsidiaries 
earn and co-evolve or fail to earn at different phases of internationalisation in institutional void 
context. Bangladesh presents an ideal context to study this, because its institutional context 
manifests weaker, often dysfunctional, and incoherent institutional structure, giving rise to different 
forms of institutional void (see, Mair, Marti, and Ventresca, 2012). As a result, CS actors’ appear to 
be instrumental in such void context (Rana and Sørensen, 2014). 
There are two reasons that rationalise our research attempt: first, legitimization of subsidiaries in 
void context is under studied. It is important to know because previous studies focused on how 
NGOs complement the institutional weakness and absence in emerging markets in developing and 
governing the markets (Mair, Marti, and Ventresca, 2012; King and Soule, 2007). However, it is not 
only the NGOs, rather several other social actors appear to be civil society, such as professional 
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associations, activist networks (see, den Hond, et al., 2014) and even influential individuals that 
manifest interests and will of citizens that play important roles to fill up void for the cause of public 
good and wellbeing (see, Yunus, 2010). In addition to NGOs (e.g. Grameen Bank), association (e.g. 
Bangladesh diabetes Association-BADAS) and activist network (e.g. NCPOGMPP) our case 
studies present the role of an CS individual with welfare mind-set, and that is Nobel Laureate 
Muhammad Yunus who has been continuously advocating for developing social business to combat 
social problems and instigate social entrepreneurship, aiming to initiate welfare-led business model 
that can complement the profit-led business model  currently disrupting social equality and welfare 
(Yunus, 2010). Thus our study illustrates an interesting nexus between several formal and informal 
CS actors & MNE subsidiaries and postulates how they together shape various levels of legitimacy 
in Bangladesh. 
Second, organisational legitimacy has traditionally been examined from the perspective of 
isomorphism (Suchman, 1995; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). It means 
organisations are bestowed legitimacy as and when their behaviour and actions comply with socio-
cultural norms, values, and rules of the dominant institutional actors (Scott, 2008). Hence 
organisations appear to be rule taker and environmental pressure receiver, instead of rules changer 
and rule, norms and value maker. This understanding encouraged studies to focus on how cultural-
cognitive institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and regulative institutions (North, 1991) shape 
organisations’ behaviour. Thus, it was presumed that the only way firms can build legitimacy is by 
being acceptable and adaptive to the expectations of the key institutional and industry actors. 
However, recent studies inform that firms tend to be innovative and appearing as institutional 
entrepreneur, thus changing and creating new routines, values, rules, and supporting institutions that 
fill institutional void (see, Zimmermann, et al., 2014; Regner and Edman, 2013; Scherer, Palazzo, 
and Seidle, 2013). This sort of strategic actions provides both legitimacy and efficiency to firm’s 
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survival and competitive advantage in a way that firms can gain operational and market efficiency 
whilst strategic actions generate local acceptance and reputation (see, Ahlstrom, Bruton, Yeh, 
2008). In this vein our study combines both perspectives– compliance & adaptation and 
institutional innovation– and examines subsidiary legitimization throughout the internationalisation 
process to see how subsidiaries earn and maintain them simultaneously or fail to earn them in 
institutional void.  
Subsidiary’s Legitimization in Internationalisation: 
Although under focused, studies on subsidiary legitimization bring a new insight on how foreign 
companies get accepted (i.e. legitimized) in host context and what legitimization process yields in 
internationalisation. While variations in institutional contexts present diverse challenges and 
opportunities to subsidiaries, they tend to respond them by employing diverse strategies with  
variations in strategic goals, abilities, and reactions of stakeholders’ from inside and outside of the 
organisation (Meyer, Mudambi, and Narula, 2011; Saka-Helmhout and Geppert, 2011; Westney, 
2009; Gifforda and Kestler, 2008; Chan and Makino, 2007). Our review aims to present 
institutional void as an unconventional context and civil society-MNE nexus as an emergent 
phenomenon to understand the mechanism and levels of subsidiary legitimacy in 
internationalisation process. This would therefore hopefully advance the understanding of 
international management of subsidiaries in emerging markets. 
The definition of legitimacy “highlights the scope of actors behaviours associated with legitimacy 
assessment, shows that legitimacy can be understood as actors’ perceptions of the organisation, as a 
judgement with respect to the organisation, or as the behavioural consequences of perception and 
judgement, manifested in actors’ actions [as strategic outcomes]– acceptance, endorsement, and so 
forth” (Bitektine, 2011).It is argued that legitimacy as a property or resource is conferred on an 
organisation by its audiences; therefore, it should be distinguished from legitimization, which 
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emphasises the process of social construction of legitimacy (Bitektine, 2011;Westney, 2009). 
Institutionalism literature defined legitimacy as behavioural consequences and judgement of 
appropriateness, desirability and acceptance of the organisation by its environment (Zimmerman 
and Zeitz, 2002; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Suchman, 1995; Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). While at 
the threshold level, firm’s legitimization process leads to ‘acceptance’ following a mechanism of 
compliance with regulative, normative and cultural cognitive standards (Scott, 2008; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). It has been further discussed that debates over which norms and logics should be 
used in the evaluation of a given organisation play a critical role in the legitimization process 
(Lawrence and Philips, 2004; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). 
This is, on the one hand, a behavioural consequence or judgement by the legitimating actors; on the 
other hand, it could be a property or resource to the organisation (Turcan, Marinova and Rana, 
2012). Subsidiary strategies throughout the legitimization process continuously interact with 
reactions of judgements and interventions by legitimating actors, which leads to construction of 
subsidiary reputation/image (den Hond et al., 2014;Bitektine, 2011), economic benefits and social 
benefits (Zimmerman et al. 2014), and these eventually help subsidiaries being accepted in society 
also. It means one level of legitimacy– i.e. output of legitimization process–affects the other levels 
to form. For example, MNEs tend to be endorsed by FSE, carbon emission, fair trade and UN-CSR 
charter, and these confer acceptance to firms, but moreover they also affect image (i.e. status– either 
positive or negative), and reputation of firms depending on how firms operationalise the standards 
and requirements of these certifications and how social legitimating actors, not just the endorsing 
agencies, judge and validate firms’ actions and motives (see, Bitektine, 2011). 
 
At the pre-entry phase, subsidiaries are prone to acquire regulative legitimacy (Baum and Oliver, 
1991) and socio-political legitimacy (Rana and Sørensen, 2014), making sure that they meet 
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regulative and cultural cognitive requirements to enter foreign market and can receive a positive 
judgement from socio-political actors, e.g. state, industry actors, and CS. Which entry mode to use 
and whether it is befitting to the institutional context is an issue that MNEs seriously consider at this 
phase. Selection of entry mode under the condition of uncertainty and institutional void tend to lead 
MNEs find a credible and locally legitimized business partner to entry in foreign context (Chan and 
Makino, 2007) This gives subsidiary an acceptance, image, and endorsement in the local 
institutional context and market (Rao et al. 2008), although MNE may not achieve all these levels 
simultaneously at the pre-entry phase but in the following phases. 
 
At the entry phase subsidiaries tend to earn market legitimacy (i.e. knowing and getting accepted to 
market) (Rao et al. 2008), cognitive legitimacy (i.e. being known as a company and brand), media 
legitimacy, pragmatic legitimacy and socio-political legitimacy (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 
1995), making sure that people, customers, industry actors, and socio-political actors judge the 
entity, activities, and products of a subsidiary acceptable (see, Bitektine, 2011). Thus, subsidiaries 
tend to collaborate with local champion firms, political actors, and CS actors by pursuing linkage 
legitimacy strategies (Child and Rodrigues, 2011; Baum and Oliver, 1991). This is because 
organisations’ linkage with highly legitimate actors in such a context provide subsidiaries with 
endorsement, image, and resource dependency opportunities (Marano and Tashman, 2012; Dasin, 
Oliver, Roy, 2007; Chan and Makino, 2007). Moreover, MNE’s prior reputation or the reputation 
that subsidiary earns by its actions in host context eventually affect the process of being accepted 
and endorsed (Goldberg, Cohen, and Fiegenbaum, 2003). 
Subsidiaries thus need to earn and maintain internal legitimacy in all these situations (Kostova and 
Roth, 2002) – from subsidiary employees, headquarter, owner/investors, partner/collaborators; 
while they also need to make sure that they ‘balance’ between multiple pressures and expectations 
of various internal and external stakeholders. This is a common condition for MNE subsidiaries due 
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to dual embeddedness (Nell, Puck, Heidenreich, 2015) and multiplicity of institutions (i.e. national, 
regional, supranational etc.) affecting MNE strategies (Scherer, Palazzo, and Seidle, 2013). 
 
At the post-entry phase, subsidiaries tend to focus on business development and growth, thus 
attention is paid to develop market development and operational expansion as well as reputation 
building, which influences brand image building and social recognition. Subsidiaries therefore 
pursue socio-political legitimacy (Rana and Sørensen, 2014; den Hond et al. 2014; Kourula and 
Halme, 2008) and pay more attention to defend legitimacy at this stage, because competitors, socio-
political actors and media at this phase seriously scrutinize subsidiaries behaviour (Gifforda and 
Kestler, 2008). Subsidiaries in this stage involve in various CSR activities (Zheng, Luo, Maksimov, 
2015) together with CS actors (den Hond, de Bakker, Doh, 2015; Marano and Tashman, 2012) and 
institutional actors (Rana, 2014). 
At this phase, business model innovation and strategic initiatives by subsidiaries result in efficiency 
gain in market development & operation (see, Zott and Amit, 2008) and help build cognitive and 
socio-political legitimacy (Rana and Maria, 2016).Subsidiaries thus appear to be innovative or 
creative in institutional context and evolve or change institution (Dunning and Lundan, 2009) that 
confer acceptance and provide operational efficiency (Regner and Edman,2013).While appearing as 
innovator and institutional entrepreneur, subsidiaries tend to collaborate with CS and institutional 
(i.e. national and supranational) actors in order to fill up institutional void and thereby earn 
operational efficiency together with ‘acceptance’, ‘endorsement’, and ‘image’. 
 
Civil Society’s Role in Subsidiary Legitimization: 
The civil society (CS) – as a broad concept– and its relation with MNE subsidiary legitimization 
have received little attention in international business (IB) studies. As mentioned earlier, there has 
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been a stream of literature focusing particularly on NGOs as the organisational manifestation of CS 
that aim to serve particular societal interests (Doh & Teegen, 2002; Teegen et al. 2004; Doh & 
Guay, 2006; Dahan et al., 2010). The importance and drive of other CS actors have been under 
focused, for example, informal activist networks / groups (den Hond, et al., 2014), professional 
associations, and individuals with ideological and welfare mind-set etc.. These actors also possess 
agency due to membership, shared value and social networks based on ideological and intellectual 
connections that are different from NGOs, and the idea that these actors have sufficiently influence 
over the market and society (Rana, 2014). 
Our study attempts to consider all these CS actors and relies on the definition of CS that 
encompasses them. Civil society by definition is ‘a community of citizens characterised by common 
interests and collective activity; that aspect of society concerned with and operating for the 
collective good, independent of state control or commercial influence; all social groups, networks, 
etc., above the level of the family, which engage in voluntary collective action’ (Oxford English 
Dictionary, 2016). 
Over the past decade, there has been a dramatic expansion in the size, scope and capacity of CS 
around the world, which has been aided by the movement of globalisation, the expansion of 
democratic governance, telecommunications, economic integration, and worldwide media 
empowerment (Rana, 2014; Lambell et al., 2008; Edwards, 2001; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). The role 
of CS tends to be prominent when socio-political and economic institutions do not effectively and 
coherently perform, thus creating institutional void that affect socio-political order, development, 
business operation, and human welfare. 
As of 2013, there are 2276 registered NGOs working in Bangladesh (http://www.ngoab.gov.bd, 
accessed on 20.11.2013). Of them, several large NGOs, such as BRAC, Grameen, ASA, RDRS, 
Gonoshastho Sangstha, are running various citizen-service-organisations in health, education, micro 
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credit and financial sector. They own hundreds of for-profit and not-for-profit companies in 
medicine, textile & apparel, chemical, energy, telecom & cybernet, and food industries in 
Bangladesh (Rana, 2014).  
Activist networks with various ideological backgrounds are also active in Bangladesh. Of them, an 
activist group ‘National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power and Ports’ 
(NCPOGMPP) is the prominent one, which managed to halt operation of several MNEs at the entry 
and post-entry phases of internationalisation (e.g. Stevedoring Services of America, Asia Energy, 
and ConocoPhillips) (Rana and Sørensen, 2014). 
Moreover, as exemplified before, Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus– as a member of CS– has 
been fighting for eradicating poverty and inequality in society. He has not only founded various 
organisations for materialising his ideological mission, but also been active in advocating ‘social 
business’ concept all over the world. He has been pursuing multilateral institutions, NGOs, MNEs, 
and social entrepreneurs to finance and build social business ventures in order to address and 
eradicate the social problems. Thus, he advocates for an alternative form of organisation in which 
structure prioritises innovation and wellbeing in society while simultaneously offsets demerits of 
capitalism (i.e. individual capital gain and excessive profit maximization motive is checked by the 
new structure of social business model) (see, Yunus, 2010). Examples of this organisational form 
are Grameen-Danone, Grameen-Violia, Grameen-BASF, Grameeen-Intel and so forth.  
CS actors pose challenges to subsidiary activities when they fail to meet standards and expectations 
of social institutions, while they provide opportunities for subsidiaries to leverage contextual 
resources, social image, and endorsement (Yaziji and Doh, 2009; Rana and Sørensen, 2014). The 
latter dimension indicates resource dependency perspective in which subsidiaries tend to seek 
external rents through CS collaboration (Lambell et al. 2008; Bryer & McGrath, 1999; Lindenberg 
& Dobel, 1999). Such resource dependency of subsidiaries reduces liability of foreignness and 
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increases opportunism in institutional void. This is because subsidiaries in relational governance 
with CS and institutional actors (Kourula & Halme, 2008) can access to complementary knowledge, 
and thereby enhance contextual intelligence (Khanna, 2014) to adapt, navigate, and innovate 
institutional void. This, however, has spill-over effect on subsidiary legitimacy and image creation 
in the respective institutional context (Yanacopulos 2005; Spar and Le Mure, 2003) so long as 
collaborating partner has higher legitimacy and image in society (Marano and Tashman, 2012; 
Reimann et al. 2012). 
Collaboration with CS actors helps subsidiaries to carryout CSR activities and leverage competitive 
advantage in upstream and downstream value chain management (i.e. sourcing local raw materials 
and distributing products in the void context). Collaboration effect reduces subsidiary transaction 
cost in international marketing as well as tensions with socio-political actors (Vachani, Doh, and 
Teegan, 2009), while it helps subsidiaries earn acceptance; in combination collaboration leads to 
synergy (see, Doh & Guay, 2006, Rana, 2014). 
CS actors’ play roles in two ways –individually or collaboratively– in institutional void. If we take 
subsidiary perspective, sustainable collaboration with CS actors requires subsidiaries to ensure 
complementarity, mutual benefit, and shared value. Only sustainable collaboration can yield 
positive spill-over effect on subsidiary image and synergy. Subsidiaries can earn legitimacy by 
employing marketing and management strategies (see, Rao, Chandy, and Prabhu, 2008), but earning 
legitimacy and efficiency– i.e. synergy– in collaboration with CS requires subsidiaries to have 
strategic intent and organisational capability (Rana, 2014). ‘Efficiency’ in synergy has dual 
perspectives: reducing cost and enhancing benefit– i.e. cost and operational benefit. Thus, 
efficiency can be achieved either by novelty-centred business model, which refers to new ways of 
conducting economic exchanges among various participants, or efficiency-centred business model 
that refers to the measures firms may take to achieve transaction efficiency (see, Zott and Amit, 
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2008). One novel way subsidiary can earn higher degrees of efficiency is by appearing as 
institutional entrepreneur or innovator in institutional void context, which subsidiaries’ can pursue 
either by its own strategic initiative or collaborative initiative with CS/institutional/economic actors. 
CS actors play diverse roles in international business activities: such as filling regulatory vacuum 
(Dahan et al., 2010), complementing cultural-cognitive constraints (Yunus and Jolis, 2007), filling 
goods/service provision vacuum (Yunus and Weber, 2010) , industry-institution creation (Doh & 
Guay, 2006), co-optation (Coy, 2013) , oversight, resource provider(Austin, 2000) , endorsement 
and credibility provider (Kourula and Halme 2008), and social activism for ideology-based justice 
(Hond and Bakker, 2007)(See, Table 1). 
Table 1:   The Roles of CS Actors in Relation to MNEs 
CS Roles Examples 
Filling regulatory 
vacuum 
Carbon emissions reporting require global coordination and private firm buy-in, so NGOs 
engage as civil regulators, and thus MNEs can effectively evade state oversight given national 
jurisdiction issues, while industries seek to avoid more time-consuming public regulation 




Micro-credit model (i.e. financing poor people without collateral security) by NGOs, e.g. 
Grameen Bank and BRAC, altered the ‘no trust’ between poor people and commercial banks 
into ‘high trust’ in micro-credit banking business. 
Goods/service 
provision Vacuum 
In the context where government initiatives are not enough, Grameen-Danone social business 
venture markets vitamin and mineral fortified yogurt at affordable price for growing children 
at the lower middle and lower classes of society with an aim of solving malnutrition and 
vitamin deficiency in Bangladesh. 
Industry-Institution 
Creation 
The formation of new EU regulation of trading genetically modified organisms was led 
mainly by three NGOs: ATTAC, Greenpeace and Friend of the Earth. 
Co-optation This formalized inclusion of challengers into the authority system that they are challenging is 
the essence of co-optation e.g. International fair trade system. 
Oversight Dan Watch and Action Aid monitor organisations’ actions as watchdogs (for critical 
transparency) and can actively protest and channel information. 
Resource providing 
to firms 
Starbucks-CARE strategic alliance with a philanthropic motive was initially donating to 
CARE projects and selling coffee to the countries that CARE projects operate in. The 
relationship evolved into a two-way exchange of ideas and management personnel, including 
joint design of workplace codes of conduct for Starbucks’ coffee plantations and factories. 
Endorsement and 
credibility provider 
Receiving Forest Stewardship Certification (FSE) or joining in ‘Ethical Trading Initiative 
(ETI)’– a leading alliance of companies, trade unions, and NGOs promoting respect for 
workers' rights- provides endorsement and credibility to MNEs. 
Activist groups  Ideological positioning of, e.g., protection of consumers, human rights movement against 
extraction industries, and activist movement against Wall Street. 
Source: Developed by Authors 
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In most cases CS actors appear to be institutional entrepreneur/innovator, so MNE subsidiaries can 
take this opportunity to co-create institutions in conjunction with CS and institutional actors. The 
co-creation process and the outcome lead both to legitimization and economic value creation for 
MNEs (i.e. efficiency), while this simultaneously leads to social value creation (Zimmermann, 
2014) for which CS strives (Yunus and Weber, 2010). This is the level at which subsidiaries earn 
synergy, and this co-evolutionary process (see, Child et al. 2012) increases opportunities for 
subsidiaries to leverage contextual intelligence (Khanna, 2014). 
The institutional condition to which CS can effectively function as ‘third sector’ (Lambel et al., 
2008) or ‘extra institution’ (King and Soule, 2007; Council of Europe, 2012) – i.e. being 
independent from the state influence and cultural dogmatism– depends on the nature of socio-
political institutions it operates in. Although we illustrate the roles of different CS actors’ 
separately, in reality they have overlapping relations and they often work together– either formally 
or informally– for the common goal. 
CS has, however, historically been defined at the national level (Schwartz, 2003), where group 
identity derives from citizenship and group ideologies in the nation-state (Florini, 2003; Pharr, 
2003), collective actions increasingly occur across borders through transnational networks (Keck & 
Sikkink, 1998; Khagram et al., 2002) and cognitive bonding based on shared ideology (Morgan, 
2001). They are however manifested in the global non-governmental organisations (GNGOs) across 
the world, for example, Oxfam, CARE, Grameen Foundations, Green Peace and activist networks. 
 
Subsidiary Legitimization in Institutional Void 
(Khanna and Palepu, 1997) coined the term institutional void (IV) that focuses on emerging 
economies to indicate weak socio-political institutions, less openness to foreign companies, and 
underdeveloped capital markets, infrastructure and regulations that affect buyer-seller transactions. 
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The idea was to understand the dysfunctionality, absence, or weakness of mechanisms in institutions 
and markets; most particularly the factor condition and environmental forces, market intermediaries 
and physical infrastructures’ that affect organisation of economic activities in a society i.e. buyers 
and sellers of products, labour and financial sector actors (Khanna et al., 2005) (See, table 2). 
Table 2: Framework of ‘Institutional Void’  
Attention paid 
to 
Void leads to Market structure 
comprising of 
Strategies proposed 
    
Market 
institutions 
Operating challenges Factor condition and 
environmental forces in the 
macro economy 
Replicate or adapt 
Transactional 
areas 




Missing product/service provisions Physical infrastructures Enter, wait, or exit; 
compete alone or 
collaborate 
Source: Developed based on Khanna and Palepu, 2010 
Institutional voids tend to be manifested in three major spaces: the structural architecture of a 
formal institution, within conditions of the market, and complementary mechanism of cultural-
cognitive and proximate institutions. Khanna and Paleppu, (2010) clearly illustrated the first two 
spaces in which voids occurred and how companies responded them by strategies. Mair, Marti, and 
Ventresca (2012) shaded light on the third type of space in which IV occurred, demonstrating how 
IV is the source of market exclusion which was underpinned by lack of complementary between 
cultural-cognitive and proximate institutions i.e. supporting formal institutions. Their study 
postulates that market exclusion in rural Bangladesh for females was caused by void, which was 
created by social and religious institutions, while BRAC- NGO complemented that void by 
advocacy programme, organisational network, and micro-finance initiatives.  
A void in these three spaces can affect subsidiary operations, performance and survival. Although 
common in emerging economies, developed economies may also have institutional void; but the 
nature of void may not necessarily affect business transactions seriously– the way it appears in 
emerging markets. 
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Subsidiaries can either depend on local economic actor to bypass or navigate IV or fill-up IV by 
corporate capability or collaborative initiatives (Khanna et al., 2005). The latter strategic initiative is 
the institutional entrepreneurship/innovation by subsidiaries and in such a case collaboration with 
CS and/or institutional actors can result in synergy. Yet, institutional void theory focuses on 
transactional efficiency subsidiaries can gain in market, but our paper illustrates synergy gain in IV 
– combination of legitimacy and efficiency– in collaboration with CS and institutional actors. 
Subsidiaries seek different types of legitimacy at different phases of internationalisation due to 
different levels of contextual intelligence they develop and their ability to respond institutional 
variations and voids. Understanding different levels of legitimacy, therefore, would help 
subsidiaries to focus on specific strategies and objectives throughout the internationalisation process 
in emerging markets where both legitimacy and efficiency earning is necessary, but not so easy.  
 
Analytical Framework 
The analytical framework (see, Figure 1) illustrating the structure of analysis shows what levels of 
legitimacy subsidiaries gain and co-construct and how are they gained and constructed in three 
different phases of internationalisation. Each phase of internationalisation entails an analysis of four 
different levels of legitimacy that subsidiaries develop or failed to develop. The question rises, how 
do we determine each phase of the internationalisation? Drawing on the internationalisation and 
born global literature (Ref…), we consider that pre-entry phase of MNE subsidiary involves 
decision making and preparation activities until the actual entry took place in host context. Entry 
phase formally begins with the physical entry as a subsidiary and its early establishment period i.e. 
upto three to four years in the host market, while the post-entry phase begins after the establishment 
of subsidiary and this naturally entails the growth of subsidiary in host context, rather than growth 
of the product market as such.  
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Figure.1 Levels of Legitimacy in Internationalisation Process 
 
Developed by authors 
Four case companies out of six (i.e. Arla, GSK, Nestle, and Novo-Nordisk) have followed the 
classical step-wise internationalisation process (see, Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) and entered the 
host market through indirect exporting from neighbouring country subsidiaries. Legitimization of 
these subsidiaries in pre-entry phase therefore could not be investigated. We take into account the 
actual entry of these four subsidiaries instead of the indirect or direct export of the product to host 
market. In contrast, Telenor and GCM had direct entry as joint-venture and subsidiary respectively, 
thus we have been able to analyse their pre-entry phase and the subsequent journey.  
Our multiple–case study finds four different levels of legitimacy ‘acceptance’, ‘image’, 
‘endorsement’, and ‘synergy’- a combination of acceptance and efficiency.  
While acceptance level indicates threshold legitimacy, firms tends to comply with social 
expectations and avoid tensions with influential legitimating actors, ‘image’ reflects how a 
company is perceived in society, which can be both positive or negative. Positive image can turn 
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Similarly, ‘endorsement’ means an approval that overrides image while also enhancing reputation. 
It is often a more explicit certification that is linked to formal validation as a result of meeting 
standard and codes, but sometimes public and/or CS’s announcement and certification that provides 
legitimacy to a subsidiary can act like an endorsement. 
Synergism indicates the high potential benefit of combined actions instead of legitimization on its 
own. This is the highest level of legitimacy, at which subsidiaries appear to be an institutional 
entrepreneur and thereby legitimise their behaviour through creativity, collaborative and innovative 
initiatives. They change or create new rules, norms, practices and values, or develop infrastructures 
to increase efficiency in operations and value creation, and thus creating synergy by integrating 
legitimacy with efficiency.  
Vertical axes of the matrix in figure 1 indicate levels of legitimacy while horizontal axes show 
firm’s commitment in the form of individual strategic initiative or collaborative initiative.  
While acceptance level can be termed as threshold level legitimacy, the other three levels may 
develop at any time either by firms own corporate strategic initiative or collaborative initiative with 
market actors or non-market actors’ e.g. civil society. However, it is not necessary that legitimacy 
development would follow the order presented in figure 1. Whilst first three levels may affect each 
other, synergy level is a strategic point at which firms build acceptance together with efficiency that 
affect operation and performance. It means it is not legitimacy alone, rather firm’s strategic 
initiative results in combined outputs i.e. acceptance/positive judgement of the legitimating actors 
and efficiency for organisation/market. ‘Efficiency’ can manifest in the form of economic and 
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We used multiple-case study method (Yin, 2009) and critical incident technique for understanding 
and theorising the levels of subsidiary legitimacy stemming from the nexus between MNE and CS 
in institutional void i.e. Bangladesh. 
Selection of Case Companies: 
Six European MNE subsidiaries have been purposefully selected for investigating the MNE-CS 
nexus and the levels of legitimacy, for example, Telenor from Norway (C-1), Novo Nordisk from 
Denmark (C-2), Nestle from Switzerland (C-3), Arla from Denmark (C-4), GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) 
from UK (C-5), and Asia Energy Corporation from the UK (C-6) (See, Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Descriptive Information of the Case Companies in Bangladesh 





































































GSK 82%, ICB 







UK Mining 2004 None N/A GCE-UK, ADB, 
Barclay’s Bank 
WO 
Note: JV=Joint Venture; SA=Strategic Alliance; WO=Wholly Owned; P= Pharmaceutical; V=Vaccine; H= Healthcare; 
ICB= Investment Corporation of Bangladesh, GB= Grameen Bank; GTC= Grameen Telecom; BADAS= Bangladesh 
Diabetes Association; GBPSKS= Glory Bondhu Protim Samaj Kallyan Sangstha; IF= Impact Foundation; GCE: Global 
Coal Management Recourses, UK. 
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Considering the research question we developed four criteria to select case companies that are 
operating in various industries in Bangladesh: first, the company must have a relation with CS 
actors- i.e. ownership relation, non-ownership strategic relation, and adverse relation; second, 
companies’ operation should link with people i.e. customer, suppliers, people etc. Third, MNE-CS 
nexus should affect the value added activities or market creation (positive or negatively) of 
subsidiaries, fourth, company should be known to the people and holding a significant market share 
in the respective industry. 
Introduction to Cases: 
Telenor made joint venture with Grameen Telecom- a sister concern of Grameen Bank, a not-for-
profit NGO, which is founded by Nobel laureate Professor Muhammad Yunus. Novo Nordisk made 
strategic alliance with Transcom Group of Companies and Bangladesh Diabetes Association 
(BADAS). Arla has joint venture with Mutual Group of companies and strategic relation with 
GBPSKS, for CSR, and CARE-Bangladesh for bottom of the pyramid marketing. GSK has joint 
venture with government financial institution and strategic alliance with Friendship-NGO for CSR 
initiatives and Tele-medicine project. Nestle has strategic relation with Impact Foundation for CSR 
and Nutrition awareness programme and with Proshika-NGO for honey cultivation. Asia Energy 
Corporation (AEC) had no relation with CS actors, rather NCPOGMPP (National Committee for 
Protecting Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power, and Port of Bangladesh- an activist group) led by 
Professor Anu Muhammad organised serious movement, protesting against AEC operations in 
Bangladesh. 
The case companies entered Bangladeshi market at different times and with different modes (see, 
Table 3). We collected data on the case companies from the point when MNEs had established 
subsidiaries or joint venture operations in Bangladeshi market instead of the direct and indirect 
exporting. 
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Data collection continued for four years from 2011-2014. The research project was funded by The 
European Commission and Aalborg University, Denmark. A native Bangladeshi researcher 
collected data from multiple actors involved in the critical incidents of MNE-CS nexus. Attention 
was paid to such critical incidents that yield legitimacy (i.e. acceptance) and efficiency as well as 
value for companies and society or the other way around. We followed a principle during the data 
collection process, and that is, we interviewed maximum number of informants who were involved 
in critical incidents of MNE-CS nexus and continued data collection until reaching data saturation 
stage. Thus, we collected data from the company, CS, and institutional informants- who know better 
and who were involved in the process of critical incident. Multiple data sources were used: for 
example, secondary sources i.e. company documents, email communication (where available), 
newspaper report & articles, NGO reports; semi-structured interviews, and the observation by a 
native researcher. In total thirty-nine interviews of CS, managers, and institutional actors were 
taken. Interviews were recorded and noted in note book and later verified by follow-up interviews 
and other informants. A database was developed with secondary and primary data, which 
culminated six detailed case reports of 160 pages that are used for this research.    
Table 4: Overview of Primary Data Sources 
Cases Related Actors Number of 
interviews 
Informants by type 
C-1 Telenor 3 General Manager; Managers  
 GTC (not-for-profit) 2 Managing Director; Managers  
 BTRC 4 Director General ; Deputy Director; Asst. Director  
 GB (NGO) 1 Manager  
C-2 Novo Nordisk 3 Marketing Manager; Senior Executives 
 BADAS (Non-profit 
Association) 
1 Project Coordinator (CDiC, BADAS) 
C-3 Arla 3 Managing Director; Marketing Managers  
 GBPSKS (NGO) 1 Chairman  
C-4 GSK 5 Directors; Corporate Managers  
 Friendship (NGO) 1 Executive Director  
C-5 Nestlé 1 Senior Corporate Manager  
 Impact Foundation 
(NGO) 
1 Project Coordinator  
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C-6 Asia Energy (AEC) 3 NCPOGMPP- general secretary Prof. Anu 





Actors that were linked 
with critical incidents 
10 CPD-Director; Supreme Court Lawyer; Professors; 
News Reporter ; Deputy Secretary of the 
Government, Director of Board of Investment of 
Bangladesh, Director of Centre for Policy Dialogue. 
Note: BTRC=Bangladesh Telephone Regulatory Commission; NCPOGMPP = National Committee for Protecting 
Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power, and Port of Bangladesh (Activist group). 
 
Coding and Analysis Techniques: 
We followed a continuous coding method based on the following criteria: what is the critical 
incident of MNE-CS nexus, what is the output of such nexus in terms of legitimacy (positive and 
negative) and efficiency, how is the mechanism (i.e. strategies) of legitimacy and efficiency 
creation, when was it created and gained (i.e. at which phase of internationalisation) in Bangladesh. 
The codes are later used for process analysis (Langley, 1999) of subsidiary legitimacy in terms of 
the three phases of internationalisation. 
 
Analysis and Results: 
Pre-Entry Phase: At this phase of the foreign market pre-entry, MNEs tend to plan how it can gain 
smoother acceptance to institutional actors, dominant CS actors, and consumers. Although industry 
context is important at this phase, subsidiaries tend to make sure that competition is manageable and 
rivalry is not so high that could jeopardise its acceptance and existence in market. Since it is a 
planning and preparation stage for subsidiaries prior to entry, the most important matter that MNEs  
consider is how to receive approval and positive judgement of the legal-political actors and market. 
Question raises, how subsidiaries can smoothly overcome the cumbersome legal and bureaucratic 
formalities to enter in institutional void , and whether society would accept the firm and its 
operation positively. Subsidiaries often collaborate with highly legitimized market actors, but 
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collaboration with non-market actors’ particularly civil society actors often pays off more, for 
example, Grameen Bank and Telenor joint-venture in Bangladesh. 
Table 5: Legitimization of Subsidiary and the Nexus of MNE-CS at the Pre-Entry Phase 
Levels \ Case Case 
No.  
What  How 
(Strategy, CS-MNE Nexus,)  
Why 
 
Synergy X    
Endorsement X    
Image X    
‘Acceptance’ 
& 
the idea of 
resource 
access 
C-1 –Telenor decided to 
collaborate with Grameen 
Bank and Muhammad Yunus 
with an aim to receive positive 
judgement from the society, 
political actors, and market, 
because Grameen name was 
previously recognised to 
market & society, while Yunus 
had high social agency. 
–Telenor agreed to commit with 
Yunus’s motive of rural 
development. 
–Agreed to swap share with GP 
after six years of company 
formation in order to handover 
governance and empower 
women members of GB. 
–Use of ‘Grameen’ name in 
Bangladesh would helpTelenor 
earn high cognitive legitimacy 
since the entry. 
– Yunus’s influence to 
government helped getting 
Telecom licence. 
 
– Telenor needed a local legitimized 
partner who could provide 
distribution network support up to 
remote rural area in Bangladesh. 
– Collaboration with Yunus and GB 
helped circumvent many 
bureaucratic difficulties. 
– Telenor wanted to make sure that 
millions of poor women of the 
Grameen Bank could have money 
to buy GP phone, and only GB 
could provide credit to them. 
Refusal and 
Tensions 
C-6 - Negative sentiment 
began to mount 
against Asia energy 
company (AEC) 
- Prof. Anu 
Muhammad and his 
activist group-
NCPOGMPP began 
to create negative 
sentiment through 
article writing and 
talk-show on 
media. 
– Activist groups believed that the 
agreement between AEC and the 
government benefitted AEC more 
than the country, while open-pit 
method that AEC planned to use 
for exacting coal would damage 
climate and livelihood of the local 
people which AEC would not 
compensate properly. 
 
At the pre-entry phase (see, Table 5), (Case-1) Telenor could not finalise its decision to entry in 
Bangladesh until Yunus and Grameen Bank (GB) explicitly agreed to collaborate and showed 
interest to have ownership stake in Grameenphone (GP) joint-venture. At that time rural areas did 
not have adequate distribution and infrastructure network, while purchasing power of the rural 
consumers was extremely low. Telenor as an MNE from Norway was completely unfamiliar to 
rural people, while GB had wider acceptance and high reputation in the country, thus the use of 
‘Grameen’ name for the newly established joint venture facilitated Telenor to get accepted to the 
political actors and the greater society. Even before the entry, media and Yunus created cognitive 
legitimacy for Telenor and the new venture Grameenphone.  On the one hand Telenor used Yunus’s 
 
Mohammad B. Rana and Olav Jull Sørensen, International Business centre, Aalborg University, Denmark 
42nd EIBA Annual Conference | Vienna | December 2-4, 2016   
 
[Date] 24 
influence to political actors while on the other hand it intended to exploit GB’s 1 million members 
as the initial customer-base. Yunus agreed to provide micro credit to GB members in rural areas for 
cell-phone purchase. Yunus’s idea was to instigate rural entrepreneurship and employment, and the 
business model of Grameephone was to provide micro credit to female Grameen Bank (GB) 
members who would buy cell phone from GP and would sell the talking-minutes to neighbours’ 
who would like to make phone calls. There was no cell phone in village areas, so GB members 
could easily make money from cell-phone business and pay back the credit to GB and make their 
livelihood. Yunus’s mission and Telenor’s mission– serving rural customer and local development–
at the initial stage matched well. Telenor, however, agreed that it would swap its share with GB 
after six years of operation and thus GB would get governance of GP at the post entry phase (see, 
Table 7). This postulates that in case of collaboration– be it with market and non-market actors, 
there should be shared vision and shared value in the relationship, and this would determine the 
degree to which foreign company could get acceptance and resource access through collaborative 
initiative in host context. In this case, pre-entry preparation and activities were housed in Grameeen 
Bank office in Dhaka, and every possible hurdle was consulted by Yunus and GB experts’ in order 
to overcome them. Due to such collaboration and strategic relation with non-market actors 
subsidiaries could earn acceptance, contextual knowledge, and informal endorsement, had access to 
resources, and these eventually affected image building and synergy in entry and post entry phases.  
In contrast, civil society and activist group in Case-6 went against Asia Energy Corporation and 
began to create negative sentiment by writing articles in newspaper, organising public meetings, 
and attending in media talk-show. Thus, in pre-entry phase AEC began to lose cognitive and 
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This phase is crucial and critical because subsidiaries in this phase make actual entry to market (see, 
Table- 6). It is important that subsidiaries get accepted in socio-political context,  and beyond that it 
requires formal and informal endorsement and complementary resource support from the 
institutional and CS actors. Since emerging markets present various types of institutional voids, 
subsidiaries with its internal capabilities may find it difficult to offset the liability of foreignness 
and institutional voids.  
Acceptance: When subsidiary enters, it may receive positive or negative judgement from the socio-
political actors. Negative judgement can turn to be critical if it is created by CS actors and activist 
groups on the basis of ideological standpoint. 
As far as positive judgement of market and society is concerned, Telenor received high acceptance 
from the customers; all the cell phones offered to the market were sold in few months of its 
operation and the market growth became rapid at the early stage of operation. Customers and 
society perceived Telenor and its product as superior and socially contributing because of Grameen 
Bank & Yunus’s involvement. Government and political actors supported it wholeheartedly because 
it had complemented rural development and shared ownership with local entity i.e. Grameen Bank. 
In the same vein (Case-2), strategic alliance with BADAS provided Novo Nordisk subsidiary and 
its products with high degree of acceptance in diabetes industry. This is because the relation with 
BADAS was based on shared value and mutual respect, while the missions of CS and MNE (i.e. 
BADAS and Novo Nordisk) were harmonized – (i.e. combating diabetes). BADAS, as highly 
legitimised stakeholder, supported Novo Nordisk in political and medical markets. 
In contrast, subsidiary may have negative acceptance i.e. CS actors protest to leave subsidiary from 
the country. A good example is Asia Energy Corporation. Even though it had received license from 
the concerned agencies and made agreement with government prior to entry, it overlooked 
expectations of local people and CS members’. The tensions stemmed before its entry and 
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aggravated since it began to operate in 2004. The Fulbari Coal mine extraction had multiple effects 
including evacuation of people and climate pollution, while Asia Energy undermined the interest of 
local development and remedies of the problems caused by coal mine extraction. NCPOGMPP led 
by Professor Anu Muhammad reacted adversely to AEC’s actions and intentions, protested in 
public media and organised activist movement against AEC to stop operation. As a result, 
operations of AEC freeze in 2006 due to violent protest and local opposition led by NCPOGMPP. 
In an interview Anu Muhammad said “not only the socio-economic benefit for the country that we 
(i.e. NCPOGMPP) demand from MNEs in the extraction, energy, and oil sectors, but also expect 
them to care about environmental damages, pay due diligence to rehabilitation and compensation 
of the affected people. None of these were considered in case of Fulbari coal project, nor did AEC 
include us or local representatives in planning how to address these issues. We want to ensure 
people’s ownership in the natural resource industries of Bangladesh”. 
 
Subsidiaries may face this sort of situation at the initial stage of entry, if it fails to address threshold 
level expectations of the society and dominant CS actors. The interesting finding is that MNEs that 
gradually entered Bangladesh– i.e. exporting from neighbouring countries or through agent, then 
setting up liaison office, and finally established full-fledged subsidiary– were good at filling up and 
circumventing institutional void. This is because they were able to accumulate contextual 
knowledge and develop relationships with key CS and institutional actors, and thereby developed 
appropriate corporate strategies that fit well. Examples of such companies are: Novo Norisk, GSK, 
Arla, and Nestle. 






What  How 





C-1 Collaboration with GB provided 
local acceptance to Telenor, 
– Telenor used GB’s organisational 
network to sell cell-phone and 
– Telenor needed partner who could 
invest capital to form GP joint-
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while it received wider 
distribution network in rural 
Bangladesh and a consumer 
base with purchasing power due 
to GB’s support. 
telecom-services in rural areas. 
– GB provided micro credit to its 
female members (i.e. around 1 
ml.) to buy GP phone. 
–  GB also sold talking-minute 
(refill) through its NGO network, 
–  GB ran mobile phone services 
centres throughout the country in 
collaboration with Nokia that 
complemented GP’s business. 
 
 
venture; it could lower down the 
risk of making investment in 
institutional void.  
– Collaboration with Yunus helped 
circumvent bureaucratic hassles. 
– Lacking in financial system, trust, 
and distribution network in rural 
context required local institutional 
support; GB complemented the 
credit system, low purchasing 
power, inadequate distribution, 




C-2 Collaboration programme with 
BADAS since 2004 provided 
strong endorsement for Novo-
Nordisk.  
–Distance learning programme 
(DLP) on diabetology was launched 
in collaboration with BADAS, 
Novo, and WDF in 2004, which 
enabled Novo Nordisk to receive 
endorsement from doctors’ 
community. 
– Novo paid high value to the 
president of BADAS, and co-opted 
him in its strategy making process, 
while he influenced the government 
policy in favour of their co-mission 
–Diabetology education changed 
the cognitive perspective of doctors 
on how to treat diabetes; while 
Novo’s role in research, methods of 
treatment, patient education, and 
CSR, quality of products, became 
familiar to doctors, and this 
provided endorsement to Novo’s 
products and operations. 
–It needed local agency to 
indirectly influence the government 
policy and machineries. 
 C-6 No endorsement and 
communication with CS actors 
i.e. NCPOGMPP, and one-sided 
strategic decisions by AEC in 
case of operating the coal mine 
project resulted in tensions and 
protest. 
Agreement between AEC and 
government revealed that local 
interests, sentiments, and 
expectations were not carefully 
integrated into the planning and 
strategic implications by AEC. 
–AEC thought that government 
endorsement would be enough, 
while it was ignorant that 
government credibility to the CS 
and local people was very low. 
Image 
(Negative) 
C-6 AEC had low image since the 
entry in 2005. 
CS actors through the media 
relations created a discourse that 
AEC was exploiting natural 
resources at the cost of local’s 
evacuation, environmental damage, 
and local ownership. 
–Because government is perceived 
to be corrupt and inactive in 
protecting the public interest; there 
was no involvement of CS and 
community actors in the decision 




C-1 Yunus’s endorsement and 
association of GB created huge 
social image for Telenor. 
Yunus was campaigning directly 
for GP  
Yunus’s mission and Telenor’s 
operational strategies were aligned 
at this phase. 
Acceptance C1 –Telenor used the name 
‘Grameenphone’, positioned 
itself as a local company 
working with Grameen Bank to 
develop telecom facilities & 
employment in rural 
Bangladesh. 
– GB’s presence provided 
Telenor a local acceptance.  
 
–Telenor complied with Yunus’s 
expectations, e.g. Yunus chose the 
name ‘Grameenphone’; Yunus 
wanted to serve rural women 
through GP’s operation; Yunus was 
always consulted by Telenor on 
how to grow the venture. 
– People found GP as a JV that 
contributes to local economy and 
infrastructure development. 
– Telenor needed local acceptance 
and association with GB, while 
Yunus provided them.  
 C-2 – Novo-Nordisk needed 
acceptance from the local 
industry (diabetes) 
association. 
–Novo made strategic alliance with 
BADAS not only for distribution of 
medicine to BADAS diabetes 
clinics, but also aligned its 
‘mission’ with BADAS to combat 
diabetes through education, support, 
and marketing of medicine. 
– BADAS advocated for Novo 
Nordisk in the medicine industry. 
 
– Novo needed to earn acceptance 
from the industry actors and the 




C-6 –Asia Energy Corporation 
(AEC) faced huge protest from 
–NCPOGMPP– a social movement 
network– led by professor Anu 
–AEC made agreement with the 
government thus overlooked the 
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NCPOGMPP since the contract 
had been signed between AEC 
and the Government for 
coalmine extraction. Protest by 
CS continued to aggravate and 
turned into massive march 
against AEC’s mining office, 
leading to violent actions and 
death tools, and finally AEC 
operation was halted in 2006. 
Mohammad brought the fact to the 
media, people and community 
leaders that how AEC had 
undermined country’s interest, local 
people’s rehabilitation caused by 
mine effect, compensation, 
environmental consequences, and 
sentiments of the local 
communities.  
importance of local people’s and 
CS actors’ expectations and 
sentiment. 
– There was no plan and strategy 
for having dialogue with local 
communities and CS actors. 
– No sign of local and CS 
collaboration on project operation 
and implementation. 
– Skim for rehabilitation, 
compensation, and 
environmental impact 
mitigation were made one-sided 
and non-transparent by AEC; so 
it did not reflect local & CS 
expectations. 
 
Image: Image building is a matter of process and depending on strategic initiatives by MNEs. 
However, subsidiaries get little time to develop it at the entry phase, while the context is foreign and 
subsidiaries hold little knowledge on how to navigate and complement institutional void. Lack of 
relationships with key social stakeholders tends to make this image building process even more 
difficult at this phase. Image can be positive or negative, and positive image in the long run 
becomes reputation for subsidiaries. One dimension of subsidiary image is, MNEs may have global 
image and that can benefit them while entering a new market. The other dimension is, subsidiary 
can focus on promotion and public relation in host context and thereby develop image at this stage.  
Furthermore, collaboration with reputed partner can have image spill over to subsidiary. In case of 
GP (C-1), Telenor earned image at the early stage due to GB and Yunus’s collaboration and 
endorsement. Negative image can be built due to same reason. For example, AEC had low image 
since the entry because it overlooked expectations of locals and key CS actors, while it focused 
more on the agreement and license approval from the government and concerned government 
agencies. Professor Anu Muhammad, a philanthropist civil society actor who runs the activist group 
i.e. NCPOGMPP  aims to protect natural resources of the country (e.g. Oli, Gas, Port, nature). He 
came to know the content of the agreement between AEC and the government before AEC entered 
the host market. The activist group publicly announced and validated the fact that the local people 
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and nation would suffer if AEC exacts coal from Fulbari mine. Since government has low 
credibility to people and civil society due to high degree of corruption and poor governance, activist 
groups managed to develop negative sentiment and low image against AEC as soon as it entered. 
Endorsement: Image and endorsement complement each other and thus there is an overlapping 
relation between them. Strategies to develop these two levels, however, may not be the same. One 
dimension of the endorsement is formal approval of the institutions, which subsidiaries need to get 
through formal process and compliance e.g. standard testing and certification, signing in certain 
standardization. The other dimension is informal endorsement by socio-political actors. Such an 
informal endorsement affects cognitive level of society, shaping credibility and image of the 
subsidiaries in void context. Novo Nordisk received endorsement from CS, first, because its 
mission was aligned with BADAS and World Diabetes Federation (WDF), and second, because 
Novo Nordisk collaboratively organised distance learning programme on ‘diabetology’ for doctors 
in Bangladesh. Diabetology education course affected the cognitive mind-set of the doctors in 
medical industry who  developed positive judgement for Novo Nordisk. These together created 
endorsement for Novo and its products in the medical market. Obviously it is  doctors who 
prescribe medicine, thus their judgement on medicine and company affects endorsement of the 
company in market.  
In the case Novo Nordisk (C-2), WDF provides endorsement to Novo Nordisk in global context. 
Global image of Novo Nordisk as a socially responsible and highly innovative company may have 
spillover effect to local image building, which we cannot necessarily ignore. 
By contrast, AEC earned negative endorsement because it did not communicate with dominant CS 
actors, e.g. NCPOGMPP; neither had it considered the expectations and requirements of locals and 
CS actors. 
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Synergy: This level of legitimacy combines both acceptance and efficiency for subsidiaries. It is 
rare to develop synergy at the entry phase due to the liability of foreignness and lack of 
relationships with CS actors. The best example of this is GP case. As explained before, 
collaboration with GB provided acceptance to Telenor, while Telenor used GBs organisational 
network as the distribution network for rural market and targeted GB members as the initial 
customer-base whom GB provided micro credit for buying cell phone. Moreover, GB operated 
mobile phone service-centre throughout the country in order to complement Telenor’s 
telecommunication business. It was an institutional void for Telenor but collaboration with CS (GB 
and Yunus)  in this case provided it with both operational efficiency and legitimacy in rural market 
and the entire country, which Telenor could not have earned alone. 
 
Post-Entry Phase: 
Acceptance: As subsidiaries tend to grow and expand operation, CS and institutional actors 
seriously scrutinise their behaviour in this phase. Subsidiaries therefore need to maintain legitimacy 
by applying corporate and collaborative strategies (see Table 7). Cross-case analysis reveals three 
situations:  
First, subsidiary begins to lose acceptance to business partner and CS & institutional actors. This 
sort of situation eventually affects subsidiary image both in local and international market. Telenor 
is a good example of it. Telenor denied swapping share with Grameen Bank after six years although 
it promised, while it was charged of tax evasion in 2005, revenue hiding in 2011, convicted twice 
for illegal use of VOIP (voice over internet protocol) and thus fined 1.68 billion and 2.5 billion 
Taka in 2007 and 2008 respectively (Rahman 2005; Reza 2008). A group interview of three high 
officials of Bangladesh telephone regulatory commission (BTRC) reveals, ‘we think all these 
misconducts are done under the direction of the top management [i.e. Telenor], because when we 
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informed them (Telenor) no one was punished or fired for carrying out such gross misconduct. So 
we believe top management does it intentionally in order to maximise the profit, and thus they [top 
management] want to take credit from the shareholders in Norway’.  
The statement of the key institutional actor shows low credibility of Telenor, while Yunus’s 
reaction affected its acceptability to both local and international context. 
With regard to written agreement of share swapping, Yunus issued a press statement in 2008: “Back 
in 1996, Telenor and we agreed that the joint company within six years should be a locally 
operated company with Bangladeshi management and Bangladeshi majority ownership. This has 
not happened. Telenor is unwilling to let go control of the company. We are now are being told that 
the words of the written agreement in a legal sense are non-committing statements. We relied on the 
words of the agreement. We believed in the agreed intentions of the parties. We believed that a 
Norwegian public listed company, controlled by the Norwegian government, a government 
supportive to the poor people of Bangladesh, would do as agreed. Telenor now tells me that it was 
a mistake to rely on their words… I am very optimistic about the eventual outcome of this 
controversy because it is really in the hands of the people of Norway, whom I have come to know 
and trust. Norwegians set a very high standard for business ethics, and they are the majority 
owners of Telenor. I am confident the people of Norway will see to it that the companies that they 
own and control honour their written intention, in all cases, and especially when dealing with the 
poor women of Bangladesh” (Statement from Dr. Mohammad Yunus, 5 September 2008--
Falkenberg and Falkenberg, 2009:363; see Lee, 2008). 
Since then distance between Telenor and Muhammad Yunus began to grow. Telenor began to 
ignore expectations of key CS collaborator, the tension stemmed in the relationship between 
Telenor and Yunus and shared value and mutual respect was no longer considered. Statement of 
managing director of Grameen Telecom corroborates this, – ‘since the birth of Grameenphone, 
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every CEO had paid visit to Prof. Muhammad Yunus in almost every month to share matters about 
Grameenphone operation. It was however a courtesy visit to pay respect to Professor Yunus and 
discuss critical issues. After all, he is the founding father and was, at that time, the Managing 
Director of Grameen Bank. This CEO was reluctant to visit him, and once he was called to meet 
Prof. Yunus, he refused to do so! I was very upset by his ignorance and reluctance towards Prof. 
Yunus and me’.  
Second, subsidiaries were alleged of violating CS expectations, but strategically managed tensions 
and regained acceptance. In 2011 Danwatch and Action Aid charged Arla for price-dumping in 
Bangladesh. The publication of these NGOs revealed that, by receiving European subsidy under the 
common agricultural policy (CAP) Arla was able to reduce milk price and thereby destroying dairy 
industry in Bangladesh. Although media reporting on the allegation did not seriously affect Arla’s 
acceptability in local market but it questioned Arla’s legitimacy and image in European markets. 
Managing Director of Arla-Bangladesh reported that “despite some legitimacy crisis in the 
beginning of this tension, we began to communicate with both Danwatch and Action Aid and 
provided them with actual data and scenarios. We assisted them to collect empirical data from the 
market so that they could see the reality, that there was no way we could use damping pricing while 
selling milk products at premium price. Finally, they were convinced and now it is no longer an 
issue in local or EU market”. 
Third, subsidiaries earn acceptance without having been involved in tensions with CS and 
institutional actors. The best example is Novo Nordisk. Novo Nordisk not only earns acceptance in 
market and society, it is also proactive to develop various collaborative strategies with CS (i.e. 
BADAS and WDF) and institutional actors in order to maintain acceptance at the post entry phase. 
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Image: While ‘acceptance’ is the threshold legitimacy, this is intertwined with and affecting the 
two other levels of legitimacy to develop, i.e. ‘image’ and ‘endorsement’ levels. Since Telenor 
began to lose its acceptance to several key stakeholders’, its image was jeopardised. Telenor 
focused on extensive promotion, public relation, and CSR activities with several local and global 
NGOs, multilateral agencies (i.e. UN, WHO), and the government, aiming to revive image and 
acceptability.  
Image not only affects subsidiary’s survival in social context, it also affects employee motivation 
and brand promotion without incurring the cost. Abdullah Al Mamun, marketing executive of 
Novo-Nordisk said ‘I am very proud of the CDiC programme [CdiC is a free clinic of Novo 
Nordisk in collaboration with BADAS and WDF offering treatment to diabetes affected children 
and pregnant women]. This programme is helping me to promote insulin products to the doctors. 
They appreciate me for this programme. My family, friends and relatives also appreciate me for 
working for a company like Novo-Nordisk’ (Blueprint for Change programme in Bangladesh, 
(2012:15). 
GSK case, however, adds on another perspective of image building in which NGOs act as a 
resource provider and source of local legitimacy. When a deadly storm destroyed all the houses and 
infrastructure in the coastal areas of Bangladesh in 2008, British Ambassador organised a project 
and invited all the British firms in Bangladesh to participate in local development in association 
with local NGO. The idea was to transform an island named ‘Majher Chor’ at Shundorban that was 
completely damaged and the livelihood of 774 people was at risk. A local NGO ‘Friendship’ was 
included in the project as implementing partner. The Communication Manager at GSK, Rumana 
Rahman, says: ‘we wanted to participate in the development process of the country at that time, and 
the opportunity came from the Ambassador, so our management agreed. Actually it was not a single 
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firm initiative, but a collective initiative of the British firms led by the British High Commission in 
order to make the British Brand Image in Bangladesh’. 






What  How 





C-1 –Continuous collaboration 
with GB provided local 
acceptance to Telenor, until 
tension stemmed in 2004. 
While village phone model 
succeeded because GB shared 
resources with Telenor. 
– Telenor runs more than 
dozens of social development 
projects to develop online 
based education, health 
support, and access to 
information. 
– GB managed Village-phone 
project and provided micro 
credit to GB members to buy 
cellphone. 
– Until 2004, Telenor 
maintained mutual respectful 
and shared value based 
relation with Yunus. 
– Telenor collaborates with local 
NGOs, associations, 
Governments, global NGOs, 
and multilateral institutions 
and thus aligned its corporate 
responsibility mission with 
various stakeholders. 
 
– Village project needed credit and sale 
support for rural consumers. 
– GB’s resource support and social image 
depended on Yunus’s judgement. 
– Telenor wishes to diversify in internet 
service business, and thus CSR projects 
on online services would complement 
its future business, while collaborative 
CSR projects with NGOs would reduce 
cost of CSR operation and increase 
social acceptance. 
 C-2 –  Novo Nordisk upgraded the 
certificate course on 
Diabetology to an accredited 
diploma for physicians in 
2008 and that enhanced 
Novo’s product 
acceptability in market. 
–  Novo made BADAS as its 
strategic partner for the 
distribution of medicine to 
BADAS clinics around the 
country. 
 
– Started ‘Changing diabetes- 
CDiC’ CSR clinics in 
collaboration with BADAS 
and WDF. This also offered 
country-wide diabetes 
education, consultation and 
awareness programme for 
patients through BADAS 
clinics that enhance its 
market.  
 
–  Improving diabetes 
management through diabetes 
educators i.e. WDF and 
BADAS in 2006. 
 
– DABAD became Novo’s 
distributor and customer for 
its own clinics. 
 
–  Diabetology education 
contributes to primary 
prevention of diabetes, and 
thus Novo can influence the 
development of guidelines for 
a long-term National Diabetes 
Prevention Programme, which 
is led by WDF + BADAS. 
  
– Novo with BADAS and WDF 
established CDiC project, 
providing free treatment to 
children, pregnant women, and 
diabetes management 
information to patients, and 
eye care in 2010. This 
provides legitimacy and 
enhances market share. 
 
– Diabetes lessons in medical education 
were inadequate and doctors were not 
aware of the modern treatment 
methods- i.e. medical education void. 
 
– Diabetes treatment was not freely 
available to poor children and pregnant 
women due to weak government 
support-system void. Similarly, patients 
having diabetes are not well aware of 
the causes; diabetes management is not 
familiar to the people. By ‘CDiC’ 
project Novo achieves its mission, 
increases acceptability to diabetes 
industry and society, and enhances 
brand image and market. 
 C-3 –  Nestle sources high quality 
honey from mangrove forest 
in Shudarban in 2012, while 
simultaneously it operates 
CSR project there to support 
honey farmers. 
–  Nestle made collaboration 
with Proshika-NGO; NGO 
provides training and micro-
credit to mangrove forest 
farmers to cultivate honey, 
while Nestle buys that honey 
from farmers.  
– Sourcing high quality honey at a 
cheaper cost was necessary to stay in 
competition in local market, while 
Nestle does not have knowledge and 
acceptability to operate mangrove forest 
project without Proshika’s support. 
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 C-4 –  Arla was accused of 
destroying Bangladeshi milk 
industry by Danwatch and 
ActionAid; thus Arla had to 
do welfare activities to 
balance this tension, while it 
aimed to expand its market 
to rural areas.  
–  Arla in collaboration with 
local NGO offered free 
education and food to poor 
children in slum area in order 
to balance tension, while it 
sales mini-pack powder milk 
through CARE’s network in 
rural area. 
– Allegation by local and International 
NGOs put Arla in a tension of lower 
acceptance and created negative image 
both in host and international context, 
while market share also declined. Arla’s 
collaborative strategies with NGOs aim 
to gain institutional acceptance and 




C-2 Collaborative projects with 
BADAS and WDF provided 
endorsement for Novo-
Nordisk.  
Novo involved BADAS 
president in CSR policy making 
and he advocates for Novo 
Nordisk publicly and endorses 
Novo at the institutional level. 
Collaborative initiatives with BADAS 
and WDF were so intensive and 
successful and the collaborators act as 
endorsing agencies for Novo in 
institutional contexts. Because BADAS 
plays key role in policy making in 




C-1 Yunus openly criticised 
Telenor in media and 
separated himself from the 
operation of GP that Telenor 
governs. 
– Yunus openly criticised 
Telenor for irresponsible 
behaviour and corrupt 
practices in the Nobel Prize 
giving ceremony in 2007 in 
Norway and in other media. 
– Telenor did not swap share with GB as 
promised and this stemmed tension 
between Telenor and Yunus. 
– Telenor did not keep value based 
relation with Yunus at a later stage. 
– Telenor was alleged of child labour, 
massive job-cut, tax evasion, illegal 







- Novo’s various social 
development and education 
programmes with CS and 
government created image for 
the company in both medical 
industry and society 
-CDiC programme in 
Bangladesh: Free care for 
children diabetes and diploma 
education for physicians created 
image for Novo’s products in 
medical industry and social 
prestige for employees. 
Novo Nordisk’s motto is to work for 
social welfare and research on 
diabetology, thus it collaborates and 
aligns its mission with several 
stockholders, which eventually creates 




GSK helped rebuild a 
devastated Island and 
provided funds and 
accessories to the people to 
begin their livelihood. This 
created image for GSK to the 
society and institutional 
actors.  
GSK together with other British 
companies led by a call of 
British Ambassador, helped 
rebuild devastated infrastructure 
of an Island and provided 
respective instruments to begin 
livelihoods of the people. This 
was carried out by an NGO 
called Friendship. 
GSK wanted to respond to the 
expectations of the local institutional 
actors including the British Ambassador, 
while this initiative resulted in image for 







Yunus’s criticism on Telenor 
in media tarnished its image 
in local and international 
market. 
 
Yunus’s mission and Telenor’s 
mission fell apart and moving 
into different direction. 
 
 
–There has been no trust between Yunus 
and Telenor, while their relation turned 
worse and Telenor overlooked GB’s 
expectations. 
 
–Telenor began to focus on maximizing 
profit instead of local development that 





C1 – Although Telenor earned 
high acceptance at the entry 
phase, but it began to lose 
acceptance both in society, 
institutional actors, CS 
partner.  
–– Acceptance level began to 
decrease due to misconducts, 
unethical practices, non-
compliance to the promise of 
swapping share, massive job-
cut, and poor working condition 
in organisation. 
– Telenor focused on profit maximization 
goal and overlooked the expectations of 
the legitimating actors. 
 C-2 – Relation between Novo and 
BADAS in collaborative 
CSR, diabetology 
education, and medicine 
distribution became the 
continuous source of 
Novo’s acceptance in 
diabetes industry. 
–Novo-Nordisk’s mission and 
collaborative activities with 
BADAS & WDF are aligned in 
same direction.  
– The relation between Novo 
and CS actors was built on 
high trust and mutual respect.  
 
– Novo-Nordisk stressed on meeting local 
and international stakeholders’ 
expectations, while it simultaneously 
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– Nestle, Arla, and GSK 
comply with expectations of 
CS and political 
institutions. 
They maintain strong 
relationships with CS actors as 
part of CSR and thus signalling 
CS and society that they 
contribute to society, while they 
also maintain relation with 
political actors and follow the 
requirements of the institutions. 
– They are sensitive to meeting 
expectations of CS and institutions. 
 
Endorsement: Endorsement at the post-entry phase has serious effect on image and sustainable 
legitimization. Our study finds two opposite conditions of endorsements. First, as discussed before, 
shared value based relation with BADAS has been a continuous source of endorsement for Novo 
Nordisk. Bangladeshi market lacks proper education and awareness of diabetes treatment and 
management, thus in such a void context endorsement validates products quality and acceptability 
in market, while it helps develop social judgement in favour of the company. In an interview 
professor Azad Khan, President of BADAS, said “in partnership with Novo-Nordisk we have 
managed to increase accessibility, awareness and affordability of quality diabetes care. Our 
partnership with Novo-Nordisk has been going on for years and is based on shared fundamental 
values’. Endorsement does not come from the collaborative work only, but subsidiaries also need to 
align its mission with CS’s mission, develop mutual trust, and pursue mutually set goals. 
 
Second, Telenor has a contrasting condition; its mission though aligned before with GB & Yunus 
was detangled, creating tensions and negative endorsement. In reaction to several misconducts, 
Yunus, on 5 September 2008, issued a public statement, saying “the police report includes severe 
information regarding Telenor’s involvement in the activities’ [i.e. child labour, tax evasion], it can 
be perceived to the committee members that the majority shareholders of Grameen Phone Ltd. are 
involved in encouraging the illegal VoIP business in the international field. The people do not 
understand that Telenor runs the company and that Grameen Telecom has hardly any effective say 
in the company operations. Grameen Telecom and I have not yet been given all the facts we need to 
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have a complete understanding of the alleged illegal activities. However, those activities should be 
fully and independently investigated and disclosed. We want the majority shareholder Telenor to 
authorise complete transparency in all these matters, including the release to the public of the 
shareholders’ agreement and all investigations of the alleged charges. We cannot allow the 
Grameen name to be tarnished directly or indirectly by inappropriate operations’’ (Falkenberg and 
Falkenberg, 2009:365). 
Yunus told Fortune in an interview in Dhaka, ‘there’s tension between us and Telenor, ‘‘there’s a 
philosophical difference. They’re oriented towards profit maximisation. We’re oriented towards 
social objectives’’ (Falkenberg and Falkenberg, 2009:362). 
However, cross-case analysis further reveals that subsidiaries involvement with CS actors is not 
necessarily the choice of subsidiaries themselves; it is an operational strategy of the HQ policies. As 
a result, subsidiaries tend to have nexus with both national and multilateral institutions and CS 
actors, depending on the HQ policy. By this way subsidiaries tend to meet multiple expectations, 
while receiving multiple endorsements from various stakeholders. Five out of six cases, with an 
exception of AEC, MNEs are the signatories in UN millennium development charter and this 
influences subsidiaries to pursue socially responsible activities with CS and multilateral institutions 
for the sustainable legitimization in global context. 
 
Synergy: While synergy combines legitimization and efficiency creation, this is an on-going 
strategic initiative for subsidiaries, depending on subsidiaries strategic intent and external 
conditions. 
Analysis finds two conditions in which subsidiaries tend to opt for synergy. First, subsidiaries aim 
to create market in institutional void; example of Telenor and Novo Nordisk fit here.  
Second, subsidiaries want to add value to the value chain management, for example, Nestle 
collaborates with ‘Proshika’ NGO in order to source honey from the Shundarban mangrove forest. 
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Proshika trains farmers and organises project in Shundarban. However, latter dimension also 
includes CS-subsidiary collaboration in case of CSR activities, because CS actors have local 
knowledge and social network as well as become cheaper operational partner that can help 
subsidiaries gain local acceptance and reduce cost of operation in institutional void context.  
By contrast, in the GP case Telenor aimed to create cell-phone market in rural Bangladesh with the 
help of Grameen Bank. Telenor had no acceptance and local knowledge in rural areas, nor did it 
have physical distribution network and financial strength. Village ladies (i.e. members of Grameen 
Bank), the initial target market, did not have purchasing power to buy cell phone; even village 
ladies did not know how to use and what to do with the cell phone. Grameen Bank with its 
thousands of offices in rural Bangladesh provided credit facilities’, distribution support, and training 
support to village ladies to buy cell phone and begin micro businesses with cell phone. 
Collaboration with Grameen Bank helped Telenor gain local legitimacy; simultaneously it provided 
efficiency in market development and operation. Village phone market turned into a big success for 
Telenor in Bangladesh, reaching more than millions of consumers. 
Managing director of Grameen Telecom said “it was impossible for Telenor alone to create village 
phone market without the support of Grameen Bank. No one knew Telenor, but everybody knew 
‘Grameen Bank’ and ‘Professor Yunus’, right? Village people trusted us, our words, and we made 
it possible, while Telenor received positive reaction from village market as well as the entire 
country because Telenor was with us (Grameen Bank)” 
In a similar vein, Arla began to focus on the bottom of the economic pyramid market in Bangladesh 
and sell small-pack powder milk through CARE-Bangladesh’s network in rural areas. CARE has 
knowledge on and acceptability in rural areas that Arla is tapping  into through collaborative 
initiative. However, Arla also needs to show commitment to the international community that it 
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participates in local development in collaboration with NGOs as part of millennium development 
goal of the UN.  
 
On the other hand, Novo Nordisk and BADAS do not work for market creation; rather market 
development and market management, thus presenting an interesting picture of synergy. Novo 
Nordisk and BADAS both aim to combat diabetes, but in Bangladesh patients are not aware of 
diabetes treatment and management methods, while medical education (i.e. Bachelor of Medicine) 
in Bangladesh contains only some hours of lecture on diabetes management, which is inadequate. 
Diabetes medicine and counselling have to reach at the bottom of the society and children and 
pregnant women who are vulnerable to diabetes need to be treated on priority otherwise they would 
cause future diabetes patients. Both awareness, education and accessibility for diabetes medication 
are inadequate in Bangladesh. This condition and weak institutional context where medical support 
for the poor people is almost non-existent and government cannot build supporting institution to 
complement these voids, BADAS provided Novo Nordisk with a platform to offer accredited 
diploma on diabetology education for doctors. Moreover, BADAS also supports to run ‘changing 
diabetes for children’ project for diabetes affected children and pregnant women, conducting free 
counselling and awareness programmes for patients through BADAS’s clinics around the country. 
BADAS became Novo Nordisk’s distributor for its own clinics and the largest institutional 
consumer. 
In this case the process of legitimization and efficiency creation lead to total value creation for 
Novo Nordisk, CS actors, and society at large.  In such a context, efficiency creation in business 
operation is hard to distinguish from legitimacy creation in diabetes market.  
Marketing Manager, Dr. Mohammad Saiful, said that “our partnership serves us in many ways; 
first, we need a local champion who is well embedded and legitimised in local context and who 
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holds agency in medical market and society. Second, the local champion (BADAS) with its 
commitment can influence the political will and the policy implications, and BADAS fulfils these all 
criteria. Third, diabetes medication requires awareness, availability, affordability, and accessibility 
of the care. Accredited Diabetes education and counselling programme provide awareness to 
doctors and patients about diabetes management, BADAS has diabetes care centres throughout 
Bangladesh and it runs the largest diabetes and Cardiac hospitals in the capital city, so BADAS 
provides availability of diabetes treatments. Moreover, we [Novo Nordisk], WDF, and BADAS 
developed a fund of approximately 67 million USD to provide free care to children who cannot 
afford to have diabetes medication. So, we have win-win situation and our collaboration with 
BADAS helps us receive high acceptance in society and industry, but not only that, our market 
operation and development becomes efficient and effective due to BADAS’s support”. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion: 
Our study reveals four different, but overlapping, levels of legitimacy that subsidiaries earn and co-
develop in collaboration with CS actors along the internationalisation process. Drawing on the 
notion that legitimacy is a resource and outcome of firm’s legitimization process, which includes 
strategic initiatives and behaviour, this empirical study advances the knowledge of legitimization in 
a way that evaluators’ judgement of firms’ actions/behaviour cannot be isolated from the image, 
endorsement, and synergy (legitimacy and efficiency) that subsidiaries earn and co-evolve in 
institutional void context. MNEs therefore are not the reactive compliant only that tend to follow 
institutional rules, values, and systems, which typically manifests isomorphism pattern, but MNEs 
also appea as proactive institutional entrepreneur or institutional innovator. Thus they create / co-
create cognitive rationales, norms & values, rules and policies, supporting and complementary 
institutions (Dunning and Lundan, 2009). While subsidiaries appear to be institutional innovator, 
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the process yields various levels of legitimacy i.e. acceptance, image, endorsement and above all a 
synergic outcome that comprises both acceptance and operational efficiency. One may interpret 
efficiency as a manifestation of lower transaction cost, but we consider these four levels as a 
resource for subsidiaries in institutional void, which  depends on MNE strategic initiatives and 
commitments (see, figure 2).  
Our study thus brings a new perspective of MNE legitimization in void context and advances the 
strategic view as well as theory of legitimization by incorporating co-evolution and institutional 
innovation dimensions. 
 
Institutional void is typical in emerging markets. Foreign subsidiaries tend to lack relevant resource 
capabilities and possess higher liability of foreignness in such a void context. CS actors in such a 
context can complement resource deficiency of subsidiaries and thereby reduce liability of 
foreignness and enhance social legitimacy and operational efficiency in local context. Our multiple 
case studies illustrate that subsidiary strategies at different phases of internationalisation process 
yield different levels of legitimacy, although it is hard to pinpoint what strategy yields what level of 
legitimacy. It is not that subsidiaries only earn and co-develop positive forms of legitimacy; 
inappropriate behaviour and strategies can result in negative forms of legitimacy too. 
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We conceptualise the levels of legitimacy as ‘spiral metaphor’, and this is in a way that every level 
is linked with other levels and every level integrates threshold acceptance. Because one level of 
legitimacy cannot stand alone without having a threshold acceptance, it means ‘threshold 
acceptance’ is an integral part of subsidiary legitimacy (i.e. white part of the spiral in figure 2), 
while shaded-parts in the spiral figure indicate different levels (see, Figure 2). It is noted that 
subsidiaries first need to earn threshold legitimacy, which determines its credibility and 
acceptability in industry and society. Subsidiary’s business model however also has to fit with 
market and institutional requirements’ at the early stage of earning legitimacy in internationalisation 
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with the basic requirements and expectations of the industry and institutions, and simultaneously 
needs to develop a befitting business model for the new/foreign market and institutional context. 
Figure 2 presents legitimacy (i.e. compliance to institutional requirements) on the vertical axes and 
institutional innovation and creativity on the horizontal axes, which means subsidiaries’ can change 
or create new routines, norms, values, rationales, and complementary institutions in the greater 
institutional system and thereby develop or co-develop legitimacy as well as image, endorsement 
and efficiency.  
In a foreign market, subsidiaries’ need to earn different types of legitimacy– cognitive, socio-
political, pragmatic, and internal legitimacy– from various evaluators (i.e. employees, shareholders, 
value chain actors, CS & institutional actors). Moreover, subsidiaries also need to meet expectations 
of HQ and transnational institutional actors, which are outside of the host context. As a result, 
subsidiaries should take into account both internal and external evaluators’ judgements and 
expectations while pursuing individual corporate strategies or collaborative strategies with CS and 
institutional actors.  
Since strategic initiatives are multifaceted, they generate various levels of legitimacy in different 
phases of internationalisation in addition to acceptance level. In case of individual corporate 
strategies, subsidiaries tend to pursue strategies related to promotion, branding, public relations and 
CSR, product innovations, celebrity and institutional endorsements, meeting expectations of 
institutions, customers, and employees’. Subsidiaries however tend to change and evolve new 
norms, values, and supporting institutions through the corporate strategies on public relations and 
publicity, product innovations, market disruptions, supporting infrastructure development etc.  
In contrast, subsidiaries in collaboration with civil society actors and/or institutional actors pursue 
similar strategies that generate different levels of legitimacy, and this is relatively sustainable, low 
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cost, and effective strategy considering the extent of impact and operational output. The 
collaborative strategies can easily develop social acceptance, image, endorsement and synergy in 
market and society. The success of collaborative strategies depends on the nature of collaboration 
and the collaborative partner’s resource capacity and prior legitimacy. Moreover, collaborative 
initiative requires subsidiaries to develop shared value and shared vision in order to pursue 
sustainable co-creation of image, endorsement and synergy. Synergy creation with reputed CS 
collaborator provides subsidiary with an acceptance in industry, market and society as well as 
operational efficiency in value creation process. Although our study focuses on civil society actors 
and subsidiary nexus, subsidiaries also tend to collaborate with institutional actors in case of 
synergy creation. 
Analysis finds that subsidiaries in case of foreign market entry require legitimacy, but this depends 
on the nature of industry and intuitional context it attempts to enter. If the context has high degree 
of institutional void, subsidiaries would have to commit for collaborative strategies with reputed CS 
actors in order to fill up such voids and earn legitimacy at the pre-entry and entry phase. Failure to 
do so may create tensions and negative credibility, and this could jeopardise sustainability of the 
subsidiary in both entry and post entry phase.  
Contributions and Implications:  
Our paper extends the knowledge of legitimization and legitimacy strategies, and postulates that 
strategic initiatives may generate different levels of legitimacy, while legitimization process may 
generate both legitimacy and efficiency, which, in practice, is difficult to separate. This new 
theorization would help managers to design collaborative strategies with an aim to earn and co-
evolve various levels of legitimacy. Given this new theorization, managers would be able to 
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integrate both institutional isomorphism and institutional innovation perspective together with 
business model innovation in order to sustain and create synergy in institutional void context. 
 
Reference: 
Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G.D., Yeh, K.S., (2008) Private firms in China: Building legitimacy in an 
emerging economy, Journal of World Business, 43 (4), 385–399 
Amin, K. (2012) 217 employees terminated: GP, www.news.priyo.com, on 10 July  
Aldrich, H. & Fiol, C. M. (1994) Fools rush in? The institutional context of industry creation. 
Academy of Management Review, 19(4), pp.645-670  
Austin, J. (2000) The Collaboration Challenge: How Nonprofits and Businesses Succeed through 
Strategic Alliances. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Baum, J.A.C and Oliver, C.(1991) Institutional linkages and organizational morality, 
Administrative Sciences Quarterly, 36:187-218 
Bitektine, A. (2011) Toward a theory of social judgements of organisations: The Case of 
legitimacy, reputation, and status, Academy of Management Review,36 (1), 151–179. 
Bitektine, A. and Haack, P. (2015) The ‘macro and the ‘of legitimacy: Towards a multilevel theory 
of the legitimacy process, Academy of Management Review, 40 (1), 49–75. 
Bryer, D. and Magrath, J. (1999) New dimensions of global advocacy, Nonprofit and Voluntary 
Sector Quarterly, 28(1), pp.168–177 
Castello, I. and Galang, R. (2012) Looking for new forms of legitimacy in Asia, Business and 
Society, 53(2): 187-225. 
Castelló, I. and Galang, R., M., N.(2014) Looking for New Forms  of Legitimacy in Asia, Business 
& Society, 53(2) 187 –225 
Cantwell, J., Dunning, J.H., and Lundan, S.M. (2010) An evolutionary approach to understanding 
international business activity: The co-evolution of MNEs and the institutional environment, 
Journal of International Business Studies, 41, No. 4, 567-586 
Child, J. and Rodrigues, S. B. (2011) How organizations engage with external complexity: a 
political action perspective’, Organization Studies, 32, 803–24.  
Child, J., Rodrigues, S.B. and Tse, K. K-T. (2012) The dynamics of influence in corporate co-
evolution, Journal of Management Studies, 49:1246-73 
Chan, C. and Makino, S. (2007) Legitimacy and multi-level institutional environments: 
Implications for foreign subsidiary ownership structure, Journal of International Business Studies, 
38(4): 621–38. 
Coy, P.G., (2013) The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements, edited by 
David A. Snow, Donatella della Porta, Bert Klandermans, and Doug McAdam, Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/9781405198431.wbespm054, pp.1-2 
 
Mohammad B. Rana and Olav Jull Sørensen, International Business centre, Aalborg University, Denmark 
42nd EIBA Annual Conference | Vienna | December 2-4, 2016   
 
[Date] 46 
Council of Europe, (2012) accessed on http://www.coe.int/lportal/web/coe-portal/pacewarning-
over-extra-institutional-players-in-the-democratic-system,on 12/02/12 
Dacin, M.T., Oliver, C., and Roy, J-P. (2007) The legitimacy of strategic alliances: an institutional 
perspective, Strategic Management Journal, 28: 169-87. 
Dahan, N.M., Doh, J. And Teegen, H. (2010) Role of nongovernmental organizations in the 
business–government– society interface, Business & Society, 49(1): 20-34. 
De Haro, S. P. and Bitektine, A. (2015) Global sustainability pressures and strategic choice: The 
role of firms’ structures and non-market capabilities in selection and implementation of 
sustainability initiatives, Journal of World Business, 50, 326–341 
Delmestri1, G. and Wezel, F. C., (2011) Breaking the wave: The contested legitimation of an alien 
organizational form, Journal of International Business Studies, 42, 828–852 
den Hond, F., Rehbein, K.A. de Bakker, F.G.A., and Kooijmans-van Lankveld, D. (2014) Playing 
on Two Chessboards: Reputation Effects between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and 
Corporate Political Activity (CPA), Journal of Management Studies 51:5, 790-813  
den Hond, F., de Bakker, F.G.A., and Doh, J., (2015) What prompts companies to collaboration 
with NGOs? Recent evidence from the Netherlands, Business and Society, 54:2,187-228 
DiMaggio, P. and Powell, W. (1983) The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and 
collective rationality in organizational fields, American Sociological Review, 48(2): 147-60. 
Doh, J.P. and Teegen, H. (2002) Nongovernmental organizations as institutional actors in 
international business: theory and implications, International Business Review, 11(6): 665–84. 
Doh, J. P., & Guay, T. (2006) Corporate social responsibility, public policy, and NGO activism in 
Europe and the United States: An institutional-stakeholder perspective. Journal of Management 
Studies, 43(1), pp. 47-73. 
Dowling, J., & Pfeffer, J. (1975). Organizational legitimacy: Social values and organizational 
behavior. Pacific Sociological Review, 18(1):122–136. 
Dunning, J. and Lundan,S. (2008) Institutions and the OLI paradigm of the multinational enterprise, 
Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 25(4): 573-93. 
Edwards, M. (2001) Introduction, In Edwards, M. and Gaventa, J. (eds), Global Citizen Action, 
London: Earthscan. 
Falkenberg, A.W. and Falkenberg, J. (2009) Ethics in International Value Chain Networks: The 
case of Telenor in Bangladesh, Journal of Business Ethics, 90 (3), pp.355-369. 
Florini, A. (2003) The Coming Democracy: New Rules for Running a New World, Island Press: 
Washington, DC.  
Forstenlechner, I. and Mellahi, K. (2011) Gaining legitimacy through hiring local workforce at a 
premium: The case ofMNEs in the United Arab Emirates, Journal of World Business 46, 455–
461 
Gammeltoft, P., Filatotchev, I., Hobdari, B. (2012) Emerging multinational companies and strategic 
fit: A contingency framework and future research agenda, European Management Journal, 30: 
175-188. 
 
Mohammad B. Rana and Olav Jull Sørensen, International Business centre, Aalborg University, Denmark 
42nd EIBA Annual Conference | Vienna | December 2-4, 2016   
 
[Date] 47 
Gifforda, B. and Kestler, A. (2008) Toward a theory of local legitimacy by MNEs in developing 
nations: Newmont mining and health sustainable development in Peru, Journal of International 
Management, 14(1): 340-52. 
Goldberg, A., Cohen, G. and Fiegenbaum, A. (2003) Reputation building: Small business strategies 
for successful venture development, Journal of Small Business Management, 41(2): 168–86. 
Greenwood, R.,Raynard, M.,Kodeih, F.,Micelotta, E. R., and Lounsbury, M., (2011) Institutional 
Complexity and Organizational Responses, The Academy of Management Annals, 5(1), 317-371 
Johanson, J. and Vahlne, J-E. (1977) The internationalisation process of the firm – a model of 
knowledge development and increasing foreign market commitment, Journal of International 
Business Studies, 8 (2), pp.23–32. 
den Hond, F., and de Bakker, F.G.A. (2007) Ideologically motivated activism: How activist groups 
influence corporate social change activities, Academy of Management Review, 32:3, 901-924 
Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international 
politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.  
King, B. and Soule, S. (2007) Social movements as extra-institutional entrepreneurs: The effect of 
protests on stock price returns, Administrative Science Quarterly, 52(3), 413-42. 
Khanna, T. and Palepu, K.G. (1997) Why focused strategies may be wrong for emerging markets, 
Harvard Business Review, 75(4): 41-51. 
Khagram, S., Riker, J.V. and Sikkink, K. (eds.) (2002) Restructuring World Politics: Transnational 
Social Movements, Networks and Norms, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis,  
Khanna, T., Palepu, K. G., & Sinha, J. (2005) Strategies that fit emerging markets, Harvard 
Business Review, June, pp.63–76. 
Khanna, T., and Palepu, K. (2010) Wining in Emerging Markets: a road map for strategy and 
execution, Boston: Harvard University Press 
Khanna, T. (2014) Contextual Intelligence, Harvard Business Review, September. 
King, B. G., & Soule, S. A. (2007) Social movements as extra-institutional entrepreneurs: The 
effect of protests on stock price returns. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52 (3), pp. 413-442. 
Kourula, A. and Halme, M. (2008) Types of corporate responsibility and engagement with NGOs: 
an exploration of business and societal outcomes, Corporate Governance, 8(4), 557-70. 
Kostova, T. and Roth, K. (2002) Adoption of an organizational practice by subsidiaries of 
multinational corporations: institutional and relational effects, Academy of Management Journal, 
45:215-233. 
Kostova, T. and Zaheer, S. (1999) Organizational legitimacy under conditions of complexity: The 
case of the multinational enterprise, Academy of Management Review, 24: 64-81. 
Kostova, T. and Zaheer, S. (1999) Organizational legitimacy under conditions of complexity: The 
case of the multinational enterprise, Academy of Management Review, 24: 64-81 
Lambell, R., Ramia, G., Nyland, C. and Michelotti, M. (2008) NGOs and international business 
research: Progress, prospects and problems, International Journal of Management Reviews, 
10(1), 75–92. 
Langley, A. (1999) Strategies for theorizing from process data,The Academy of Management 
Review, 24(4): 691–710. 
 
Mohammad B. Rana and Olav Jull Sørensen, International Business centre, Aalborg University, Denmark 
42nd EIBA Annual Conference | Vienna | December 2-4, 2016   
 
[Date] 48 
Lawrence, T.B., and Philips, N. (2004) From moby dick to free willy: Macro-cultural discourse and 
institutional fields, Organization, 25: 161-187. 
Lee, M. (2008) Bangladesh’s Yunus May Sue Telenor For Control of Grameenphone’, Bloomberg, 
5 September, accessed on http://www.scribd.com/doc.6083426/Bloom-berg.  
Mair, J., Marti, I., and Ventresca, M. (2012) Building inclusive markets in rural Bangladesh: How 
intermediaries work institutional voids, Academy of Management Journal, 55(4): 819-50. 
Marano, V. and Tashman, P. (2012) MNE/NGO partnerships and the legitimacy of the firm, 
International Business Review, 21: 1122-1130. 
Maurer, J. G. (1971) Readings in Organization Theory: Open-System Approaches. New York: 
Random House.  
Meyer, K., Mudambi, R. and Narula, R., (2011) Multinational enterprises and local contexts: The 
opportunities and challenges of multiple embeddedness, Journal of Management Studies, 48(2): 
231-52.  
Morgan, G. (2001a) Transnational communities and business systems, Global Networks, 1 (2), pp. 
113–130 
North, D.C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Nell, P. C., Puck, J., and Heidenreich, S. (2015) Strictly limited choice or agency? Institutional 
duality, legitimacy, and subsidiaries’ political strategies, Journal of World Business 50, 302–311 
Pharr, S.J. (2003) Preface, In Schwartz, F.J. and Pharr , S.J. (eds.) The State of Civil Society in 
Japan, pp: xiii–xviii, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge   
Oxford English Dictionary (2014) on http://www.oed.com, accessed on 20.03.14 
Rao, R.S., Chandy, R.K. and Prabhu, J.C. (2008) The fruits of legitimacy: Why some new ventures 
gain more from innovation than others, Journal of Marketing, 72: 58-75. 
Rahman, S. (2005) Grameen Phone evades Tk 31 crore tax, BDNews24.com, 22 June 
Rana, M.B. (2014) Rethinking Business System Theory from the Perspective of Civil Society, 
Transnational Community, and Legitimacy: Strategies of European MNCs in Bangladesh, PhD 
Thesis (Unpublished), International Business Centre, Aalborg University, Denmark. 
Rana, M.B. and Sorensen, O.J. (2014) Sentiments that affect socio-political legitimacy of TNCs in 
Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan: Sustainable strategic management from an institutional 
perspective, Journal of Transnational Management, 19(1), 62-106. 
Rana, M.B.and  Elo, M (2016)  Diaspora, civil society actors, emerging market entry, In Maria Elo 
and Liesl Riddle, Diaspora and Business, Inter-Disciplinary Press, Oxford, UK, 73-84  
Rana, M.B. and Elo, M. (2017) Transnational Diaspora and Civil Society Actors Driving MNE 
Internationalisation: The Case of Grameenphone in Bangladesh, Journal of International 
Management, Forthcoming. 
Rao, R.S., Chandy, R.K. and Prabhu, J.C. (2008) The fruits of legitimacy: Why some new ventures 
gain more from innovation than others, Journal of Marketing, 72: 58-75. 
Regner, P. and Edman, J. (2013) MNE institutional advantage: How subunits shape, transpose and 
evade host country institutions, Journal of International Business Studies,45:1-28. 
Regner, P. and Edman, J. (2013) MNE institutional advantage: How subunits shape, transpose and 
evade host country institutions, Journal of International Business Studies,45:1-28. 
 
Mohammad B. Rana and Olav Jull Sørensen, International Business centre, Aalborg University, Denmark 
42nd EIBA Annual Conference | Vienna | December 2-4, 2016   
 
[Date] 49 
Reimann, F.,Ehrgott, M., Kaufmann, L.,Carter , C. R. (2012) Journal of International Management, 
18, 1–17 
Reza, S.I. (2008). GP fined Tk 2.5b for using illegal VoIP, The Financial Express, 15 August 
Rosenzweig, P.M. and Singh, J.V. (1991) Organizational environments and the multinational 
enterprise, Academy of Management Review, 16(2): 340-61. 
Saka-Helmhout, A. And Geppert, M. (2011) Different forms of agency and institutional influences 
within multinational enterprises, Management International Review, 51: 567-92. 
Scherer, A., Palazzo, G. and Seidle, D. (2013) Managing legitimacy in complex and heterogeneous 
environments: Sustainable development in a globalised world, Journal of Management Studies, 
50(2), 259-84. 
Schwartz, F.J. (2003) What Is Civil Society? In Schwartz, F.J., and Pharr, S.J., (eds.) The State of 
Civil Society in Japan, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, pp. 23–41.  
Scott, R. (Ed.) (2008) Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests, Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Spar, D.L. and Le Mure, L.T. (2003). The power of activism: assessing the impact of NGOs on 
global business. California Management Review, 45, 78–101. 
Suddaby, R. and Greenwood, R.(2005) Rhetorical strategies of legitimacy, Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 50: 35-67. 
Suchman, M. (1995) Managing legitimacy: Strategies and institutional approaches, Academy of 
Management Review, 20(3): 571–610. 
Taaza Khabar (2012) Subscriber sues 11 GP high-ups, on http://tazakhabar.com. 24 September. 
Teegen, H., Doh, J.P., and Vachani, S. (2004) The importance of nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) in global governance and value creation: An international business research agenda, 
Journal of International Business Studies, 35(6), 463-83. 
The Daily Star (2012) JS Panel asks GP to resolve job cut issue. 19 July 2012 
Turcan, R.V., Marinova, S.T., and Rana, M.B. (2012) Empirical studies on legitimation strategies: 
A case for international business research extension, in Tihanyi, L., Devinney, T.M., and 
Pedersen, T., (Eds.), Advances in International Management- Institutional Theory in 
International Business and Management, 25: 425-70. 
Westney, D.E. (2009) The multinational firm as evolutionary system, In Collinson, S. and Morgan, 
G., (eds.) Images of the Multinational Firm, John Wiley & Sons, UK. pp.117-144. 
Vachani,S, Doh, J.P., Teegen, H. (2009)  NGOs’ influence on MNEs’ social development strategies 
in varying institutional contexts: A transaction cost perspective, International Business Review, 
18(5), pp. 446–456 
Yanacopulos, H. (2005) The strategies that bind: NGO coalitions and their influence. Global 
Networks: A Journal of Transnational Affairs, 5(1): 93-110. 
Yaziji, M., & Doh, J. (2009) NGOs and corporations: Conflict and collaboration. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Yin, R.K. (2009) Case study Research- design and methods, Fourth edition, Sage Publication, USA. 
Yunus, M., and Jolis, A. (2007) Banker to the Poor- Micro-lending and the battle against world 
poverty, Public Affairs, USA 
Yunus, M. and  Weber, K. (eds.) (2010) Building Social Business: The New Kind of Capitalism 
That Serves Humanity's Most Pressing Needs, Barnes & Noble, USA. 
 
Mohammad B. Rana and Olav Jull Sørensen, International Business centre, Aalborg University, Denmark 
42nd EIBA Annual Conference | Vienna | December 2-4, 2016   
 
[Date] 50 
Zott, C. and Amit, R. (2008) The fit between product market strategy and business model: 
implications for firm performance, Strategic Management Journal, 29(1): 1–26 
Zimmerman, M., & Zeitz, G. (2002) Beyond survival: Achieving new venture growth by building 
legitimacy, Academy of Management Review, 27(3), pp. 414–431.  
Zheng, Q., Luo, Y.,Maksimov, V. (2015) Achieving legitimacy through corporate social 
responsibility:The case of emerging economy firms, Journal of World Business, 50, 389–403 
Zimmermann, A., Gomez, P., Probst, G., and Raisch, S. (2014) Creating Societal Benefits and 
Corporate Profits, MIT Sloan Management Review, Spring, 55 (3), pp.18-21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
